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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
INDIANA MINERAL LAPSE STATUTE
MINING AND MINERAL INTERESTS-TERMINATION: In a 54 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court holds Indiana's Dormant Mineral
Interests Act constitutional. Severed mineral interests not "used" for
a period of twenty (20) years shall automatically revert to the current
owner of the surface property, unless the mineral interest owner files
a statement of claim in the local county recorder's office. Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct 781 (1982).

INTRODUCTION

A critical issue arising during the oil shortage of the 1970s and continuing today is the need to develop domestic mineral resources, primarily
oil and gas. Increased mineral production can be significantly hindered
when the owners of "severed mineral interests"' become fractionalized
and cannot be located. 2 Many state recording statutes have proven ineffective because they do not require further periodic recording of transferred mineral interests. This difficulty in locating the owners of
fractionalized mineral interests has hindered and even foreclosed efforts
to develop many promising mineral properties.
Many states enacted new statutes to facilitate the production of properties which have severed mineral interest owners. 3 The underlying purpose of each statute was to eliminate unknown or unlocatable owners of
severed mineral interests whose absence severely inhibited the development of the property. These statutes terminated the ownership rights of
the severed mineral interests owner unless statutory conditions were met.
The conditions included: 1) production within a certain number of years,
2) payment of taxes, 3) payment of rents or royalties, or 4) recording a
claim of right or interest unless one of the above requirements has been
satisfied within a given number of years. 4 Most states also provide for a
1. Severed mineral interest is defined as title to the mineral interest in property which has been
separated from title to the surface interest in that property. See 8 H. WILLIAMS and C. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 692 (1982).
2. Interests may become fractionalized by being divided among several persons in attempts to
spread the cost of their acquisition or to limit the risks assumed by each individual. Interests may
also become fractionalized as their owners sell portions of them for profit as opposed to profiting
from the development and sale of the oil. Distributions following the death of an interest holder
also tend to create fractional interests owned by a number of heirs. See Kuntz, Old andNew Solutions
to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped MineralInterest, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 81 (1971).
3. FLA. STAT. ANN § 704.05 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 197 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 thru 32-5-11-8 (Bums 1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§554.291 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN §93.52 (Vest 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§57-288
thru 57-291 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.30 (West 1981).
4. See statutes cited supra, note 3.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

grace period of two (2) to five (5) years before the statutes become
effective. 5 The grace period was to allow citizens to become familiar with
the laws and file their claims of right if necessary.
Constitutional challenges to these mineral lapse statutes quickly followed.6 The arguments raised against the lapse statutes included the following: 1) legitimate state goals were not properly accomplished by the
statutes, 2) property was being taken without just compensation, 3) the
obligations of contracts were impaired, 4) property rights were extinguished without proper notice, and 5) violations of the equal protection
clause existed.7 Prior to the Supreme Court's acceptance of the appeal
in Texaco Inc. v. Short,' only two states, Michigan and Indiana, had
upheld their statutes against these challenges. 9
THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS ITS MINERAL
LAPSE STATUTE
The Indiana Dormant Mineral Interest Act" was passed by the Indiana
Legislature in 1971. The Act provides that severed mineral interests would
automatically revert to the current surface owner of the land unless one
of the following conditions was met:
1. Sufficient "use" of the mineral interest by the owner. "Use" was
defined to include actual or attempted production of minerals, payment of rent or royalties, or the payment of taxes within a twenty
year period;
2. Filing a statement of claim in the local county recorder's office
within the twenty year "non-use" period;
3. Owning ten or more mineral interests in the same county and
inadvertently omitting to file a statement of claim within the required
period."
The statute provided for a two year grace period before it became effective
so that interested parties would have sufficient time to familiarize themselves with the new law and take appropriate action to preserve their
mineral interests.
The plaintiffs in Texaco v. Short failed to file a "statement of claim"
within the two year grace period and had not "used" their severed mineral
5. Id.
6. Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.W.2d 522 (1980); Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835,
272 N.W.2d 768 (1978); Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980); Contos v. Herbst, 278
N.W.2d 732 (Minn 1979); Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Pederson, 80 Wis. 2d
566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
7. See cases cited, supra, note 6.
8. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
9. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich 21, 299
N.W.2d 704 (1980).
10. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 thru 32-5-11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
11. Id.
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interest during the previous twenty year period. According to the statute,
therefore, their title automatically reverted to the owners of the surface
estate. Each plaintiff brought a separate action to declare the statute
unconstitutional and void the transfer of the mineral interest to the surface
owner. The cases were consolidated in the circuit court and a judgment
was entered which declared the Mineral Lapse Act unconstitutional.
In an opinion written by Justice DeBruler, the Supreme Court of Indiana
reversed the circuit court and upheld the Mineral Lapse Act.'I The court
found that: 1) the Act addressed a legitimate state interest, 2) the legislature had the power and authority to effectuate this interest, and 3) the
legislature did not unconstitutionally violate state or federal equal protection, contract, eminent domain, or due process requirements.
The legitimate state interest furthered by the Act was the facilitation
of mineral production by remedying uncertainties in titles. The legislature
believed that "stale and abandoned interests created uncertainties in titles
and constitutes an impediment to the development of mineral interest that
may be present."' 3 Mineral properties on which there had been no display
of activity or interest for a period of twenty years were to be considered
"mischievous and contrary to the economic interest and welfare of the
public."' 4 Such interests were considered abandoned unless the owners
took affirmative action to preserve them by filing a claim in the county
recorder's office.
The power of the legislature to place restrictions on the owners of
mineral interests was held to be inherent in the state's "police powers."
In Formanv. State ex rel. DepartmentofNaturalResources, '"the Indiana
court upheld the enactment of laws, within constitutional limits, to "promote order, safety, health, morals and the general welfare of society."6
The restrictions placed upon the police power required that the "method
and means used to protect the public order, health, morals, safety or
welfare must have some reasonable relation to the purpose or end sought.""v
The Short court's determination, therefore, was that the lapse statute
actually promoted the general welfare of society, the methods chosen to
achieve this purpose were reasonable and the statute was a justifiable
exercise of the state's police power.
The Mineral Lapse Act distinction between owners of more than ten
severed mineral interests and owners of less than ten interests was held
to be rational by the Indiana Supreme Court and not in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection), or Article I, Sec. 23, of the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Short, 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1980).
Id.at627.
Id.
387 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. App. 1979).
Id.at460.
Id.
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Indiana Constitution. "The Legislature could reasonably have concluded
that those meeting the criteria set forth above (owners of more than ten
interests) include those most likely to assemble such interests and actually
produce minerals."'" Owners of multiple interests would be the parties
most likely to produce the minerals and exempting them from inadvertent
failures to file claims of right rationally promoted the objectives of the
statute. Such a classification was not suspect or arbitrary and the court
ruled that it complied with the fair and substantial relation test applicable
under these circumstances.
The Indiana court resolved the issue of whether contracts were unconstitutionally impaired by comparing the lapse statute with statutes of
limitation and adverse possession statutes which arguably impair contracts
as well. The court ruled that "the objectives were valid and similar to
those served by acts of limitation and the law of adverse possession." 9
Although state statutes may impair contracts, the court recognized that
certain statutes must take priority in order to protect the police power.
The major issue addressed by the Indiana Supreme Court was whether
the Mineral Lapse Act violated due process notice requirements. The
Indiana court upheld the Legislature's determination that notice was sufficient to all interested parties. The court relied upon the enactment of
the statute and the availability of a two year grace period enabling citizens
to become familiar with the new law as sufficient notice. Authority for
this position was based upon cases such as Anderson National Bank v.
Luckett,2 ° Terry v. Anderson,2 and Wilson v. Iseminger2 2 which support
the termination of property interests based upon the use of statutory notice
with a grace period rather than stricter forms of actual notice.23 The court
again analogized the Mineral Lapse Act to statutes of limitation and
adverse possession laws. The court noted that "under the statute of limitations and the law of adverse possession a fee simple title to land is
terminable." 24 "This court has often decided that statutes of limitation
affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is
given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect . . ."' The Short court, therefore, linked the similarities between
the Mineral Lapse Act, statutes of limitation, and statutes of adverse
possession together to legitimize the Legislature's granting of statutory
notice rather than stricter forms of notice.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Short, 406 N.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 630.
321 U.S. 233 (1944).
95 U.S. 628 (1877).
185 U.S. 55 (1902).
Short, 406 N.E.2d at 629-30.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 630.
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THE U.S. SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE MINERAL
LAPSE STATUTE
Upon appeal by the mineral interest owners, the U.S. Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, upheld the Indiana Mineral Lapse Statute stating: 1)
Indiana had the power to enact the statute and it furthered legitimate state
goals; 2) The Act did not take property without just compensation; 3)
The Adt did not impair the obligation of contracts; 4) The Act did not
extinguish property rights without adequate notice; and 5) The Act's
exceptions did not violate the equal protection clause.26 The major focus
of the Court's opinion was the legitimacy of the statute, equal protection,
and notice.
The majority agreed that the Mineral Lapse Act was a proper exercise
of the state's police power and that it furthered legitimate state interests.
The Court stated that, "just as a state may create a property interest that
is entitled to constitutional protection, the state has the power to condition
the permanent retention of that property right on the performance of
reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to retain the interest." '27 This position emulated that of the Indiana court in that it analogized the Mineral Lapse Act to a statute of limitation and an adverse
possession statute. The Court also relied on Supreme Court decisions
such as Wilson v. Iseminger,28 Terry v. Anderson, 9 Hawkins v. Barneys
Lessee,3" and Jackson v. Lamphire,3 ' as authority for their position. By
accepting the theory that the Mineral Lapse Act was analogous to a statute
of limitation the Supreme Court was able to legitimize the termination
of severed mineral interests as a valid exercise of the state's police power.
The theory that the Indiana Legislature properly exercised its police
power to facilitate a legitimate state interest was applied to dispel the
equal protection argument made by the appellant. The majority gave
blanket approval to the state court's analysis of the issue and stated that
giving owners of ten or more mineral interests actual notice before their
interest lapsed, as opposed to automatic lapse for owners of less than ten
'32
mineral interests, was "unquestionably legitimate.
The final analysis focused on the issue of notice. The majority ruled
that a two year grace period following the enactment of a statute was not
"so unprecedented and ... constitutionally inadequate ' 33 as to fail to
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
Id. at 790.
185 U.S. 55 (1902).
95 U.S. 628 (1877).
30 U.S. 457 (1831).
3 Pet. 280 (1830).
Texaco, 102 S. Ct. at 797.
Id. at 793-794.
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protect citizens from "the silent actions of the legislature." 34 Once again,
the majority cited statute of limitation cases such as Anderson,35 Jackson,36
and Wilson37 to distinguish the notice requirements in the Indiana Lapse
Act from the stricter notice requirements which had been established by
Hanover Bank & Trust
more recent decisions such as Mullane v. Central
4
4
39
Co., 38 Covey v. Somers, Walker v. Hutchinson' " and Fuentesv. Shevin. 1
The majority distinguished the stricter notice requirement cases by stating
"it has never been suggested that each citizen must in some way be given
specific notice of the impact of a new statute on his property before that
law may affect his property rights. "42
ANALYSIS
The following analysis of the U. S. Supreme Court decision in Texaco
Inc. v. Short is divided into three sections. The first analysis focuses on
the classification of severed mineral interests as applied in this case. The
second analysis addresses the issues focused upon the majority, i.e., the
taking of private property without just compensation, equal protection,
and notice. The final analysis will address the effectiveness of the Mineral
Lapse Act in carrying out the legitimate state interest to increase mineral
production.
By the enactment of the Mineral Lapse Statute, the Indiana Legislature
wanted to create an equitable means of facilitating the development of
severed mineral interests. Although the Indiana court indicated that it was
unsure exactly what property classification to label severed mineral interests, it did recognize them as vested interests in real estate entitled to
the same protection as fee simple interests. 43 Such an interpretation was
correct in one sense but confusing in another.
The classifications for property interests in surface estates are different
than classifications for sub-surface estates. Sub-surface interests in a mineral estate are classified as either corporeal or incorporeal in character.
An incorporeal interest is defined as "a non-possessory" interest in real
property, while a corporeal interest is defined as a "possessory" interest
in real property. A number of states regard severed interests in minerals,
34. Id. at 794, 802.
35. 95 U.S. 628 (1877).
36. 3 Pet. 280 (1830).
37. 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
38. 399 U.S. 306(1950). (Notice by publication under state small trust pooling statute disallowed.)
39. 351 U.S. 141 (1955). (Notice of foreclosure to incompetent rather than to a guardian held
invalid.)
40. 352 U.S. 112 (1956). (Notice by publication under state condemnation statute held invalid.)
41. 407 U.S. 67 (1971). (Prejudgment replevin statute without prior notice to owner disallowed.)
42. Texaco, 102 S. Ct. at 795.
43. Short, 406 N.E.2d at 627.
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created by deed or lease, as incorporeal interests, also known as "profits
a prendre. 4 Previous decisions indicate that the Indiana courts have
adopted this non-ownership theory and classify severed minerals interests
as incorporeal in character. 4' The Indiana Supreme Court, however, never
addressed the coporeal versus incorporeal distinction, but simply classified severed mineral interests as real property rather than as personal
property.46 The difference between the two classifications should be noted.
"The classification of an interest in minerals (or the proceeds thereof) as
real property or as personal property is a question separate and distinct
from the classification of the interest as corporeal or incorporeal. The
former classification is made on the basis of duration, the latter on its
possessory nature. Nevertheless, the two questions of classification have
sometimes been confused." 47 The misunderstanding of the proper classification for mineral interests in Indiana ultimately hindered the Short
court in its analysis.
The Indiana Supreme Court inappropriately gave Indiana's severed
mineral interests more protection than such interests are entitled. Once
the court declared these interests to be vested interests entitled to the
same firm protection as fee simple interests in the surface, they had to
analogize the Mineral Lapse statute to abandonment statutes and statutes
of limitation in order to legitimize its effects. Fee simple interests in
surface estates are terminable only by strict compliance with adverse
possession statutes. The Mineral Lapse Act, however, does not require
the surface owner to comply with any of the elements of adverse possession because it was not designed to be an adverse possession statute.48
The Mineral Lapse Act is an abandonment statute, not an adverse possession statute. Neither the Indiana nor U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the fact that fee simple interests in surface estates can only be involuntarily
terminated when affirmative action has been initiated by another party.
If severed mineral interests are to receive the same protection as fee
simple interests in surface estates, as stated by the Indiana Supreme Court,
44. 8 H. WILLIAMS and C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms,
354 (1982). (Note that the majority of jurisidictions classify severed mineral interest as corporeal.)
45. See Halbert v. Hendrix, 121 Ind. App. 43. 95 N.E.2d 221 (1950); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
177 U.S. 190 (1900).
46. "If the interest had a duration of freehold estate, it was real property or real estate; if it had
the duration of a non-free hold estate, it was a chattel real, a personal property interest in land." 2
H. WILLIAMS and C. MEYERS, OILAND GAS LAW, Creationand Transferof PropertyInterests,
§212, at. 130.2 (1982).
47. Id. at 131.
48. The elements of adverse possession may include: actual, open, notorious, exclusive, continuity, claim of right, color of title, and payment of taxes. These requirements rest on the policy
judgment that existing rights in land should not be lost without the owner being put on guard
sufficiently to enable him to take preventative action by acting with reasonable promptness. See, 7
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 709-762.16 (1982).
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then they should only be subject to abandonment by affirmative judicial
action or by meeting the elements of adverse possession. The Mineral
Lapse Act's failure to provide this protection points out an error in the
courts analysis.
Proper classification of severed mineral interests as incorporeal would
have simplified the Indiana court's analysis and provided the court with
a stronger argument to support the termination of severed mineral interests.49 Severed mineral interests in Indiana are incorporeal.5" "In states
which classify a mineral interest or leasehold interest as incorporeal in
character, it has been held that such interests may be extinguished by
abandonment." 5 1 Abandonment "is usually defined as non-use for a period
of time coupled with an intent on the part of the owner to give up or
extinguish the interest. Although intent is a necessary element of abandonment, such intent may be implied in appropriate cases from long
continued non-use." 52 By applying the abandonment doctrine to Indiana's
Mineral Lapse Statute it is reasonable to conclude that severed mineral
interests were previously subject to abandonment in Indiana and should
not have been declared to deserve the same protection as fee simple
interests in surface estates. The effect of the Mineral Lapse Act was simply
to specify the period of non-use by the owner of a severed mineral interest
which would qualify that interest as abandoned.
The issue of whether the Mineral Lapse Statute effected a taking of
private property for public use without just compensation to the owner
should be examined. The vast majority of the surface interests in real
property are owned by either the state or federal government. Many
severed mineral interests which statutorily reverted to the owner of the
surface estate actually reverted to a state or federal government. The
Mineral Lapse Act effectively reverted mineral interests back to the public
without compensating the original owner. Neither the Indiana nor the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in this light. Both courts stated
that it is the owner's failure to act and not the action of the state that
causes the lapse in the property right. 3
49. See Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 883-886, 69 Cal Rptr. 612, 628-630, 442 P.2d
692, 708-710 (1968). A proper distinction between fee interests and incorporeal interests was made
by the California court in that case. "Cases using 'fee interest' in describing an incorporeal hereditament refer only to its duration and do not hold that it cannot be abandoned . . . To summarize
we look to the 'nature' of the interest as well as its 'duration' to define the plaintiff's rights. Incorporeal
interests, as distinguished from corporeal ones, may be abandoned, whatever their life, whether
limited or unlimited in time, whether 'fee' or a term, whether perpetual or restricted. In short, the
temporal life of the hereditament does not tell us for this purpose what 'kind' of a legal interest it
is; we must classify it according to its genus, not merely its duration characteristics."
50. See supra note 45.
51. 1 H. WILLIAMS and C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, Creationand Transfer of Property
Interests, §210.1, at 109 (1982).
52. Id.
53. Texaco, Ind. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. at 792; Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d at 631.
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Both courts' analyses of whether the Mineral Lapse Act violates the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be examined. The statute requires actual notice to an owner of ten or more mineral
interests before one of his interests may lapse due to the owner's inadvertence. Both courts justified this unequal treatment by asserting that it
promoted the legitimate state interest of encouraging multiple ownership
and increasing the likelihood of actual production. 4 This "legitimate"
state interest, however, has questionable foundation. Oil companies drill
for oil based upon encouraging geological surveys and other data. If the
surveys are unfavorable, the company will not engage in any type of
production activity regardless of how many property interests are held
by the mineral interest owner. Single or multiple ownership does not enter
into this initial production decision. An accurate analysis of the "ten
mineral interest exception" may disclose that major oil interests lobbied
for this exception to protect themselves from the lapse of their severed
mineral interests before receiving actual notice. Further inquiry to determine the owners of more than ten severed mineral interests in Indiana's
counties might well verify this assumption. Legitimacy should not be
founded upon the strength of one group's ability to influence legislation.
Conformity with the underlying principles actually being promoted should
be the standard by which legislation is upheld as legitimate. Where obvious discrepancies exist a court should scrutinize the legislature's actions
more carefully.
The analysis of the notice requirement to the owners of severed mineral
interests is the issue in both the Indiana and the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions which should be most seriously questioned. It is true that a
distinction can and should be made between notice of judicial actions
and notice of legislative actions. The enactment of a statute which greatly
affects a real property right, however, should be fair and rational. 5 Circumstances must be recognized to exist where a state simply cannot rely
upon the maxim that a man is presumed to know the law.56 Reliance
simply upon the passage of time, be it two years or ten years, should
never be enough to legitimize a failure to give more effective notice to
those being improperly damaged when it is reasonable to inform them
by other means. Both courts recognized that real property rights deserve
the utmost protection of the law.57 Notice by self-executing statute and
a grace period simply was not the firmest protection available under the
law. Termination of real property interests deserves more than a selfexecuting statute, especially where stricter forms of notice are reasonably
54.
55.
56.
57.

102 S.Ct. at 797; 406 N.E.2d at 631-632.
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d at 627.
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available, more equitable, and provide a much higher degree of protection
to affected parties.
The legitimate state interest used to support the Mineral Lapse Act
should be examined. The Indiana Supreme Court stated that the statute
would encourage mineral interest owners to develop their interests and
to enhance the collection of property taxes." Arguably, however, this
policy will not be effective in many situations and may in fact prove to
be detrimental to the development of many severed mineral interests. Oil
companies will be uneasy about drilling on property in which the surface
owner claims the minerals have reverted back to the surface estate unless
it can be absolutely verified that the property has not been "used" for
twenty years and the surface owner's reversion is legitimate. The possible
uncertainties of title created by the Mineral Lapse Statute may make it
just as difficult for an oil company to drill today as it was prior to the
enactment of the statute. Numerous legal battles over the ownership of
severed minerals interest will also slow up the opportunity to increase
production.
CONCLUSION
The Mineral Lapse Act should not have been upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The inequitable aspects of the statute provide an unacceptably low level of protection for property rights which are not adequately justified by the underlying state goals. Indiana is allowed to create
an abandonment statute for its incorporeal severed mineral interests, but
property owners deserve protection under the law which is both equal
and equitable. The U.S. Supreme Court should not have compromised
such an important interest on a state statute which provides minimal notice
as well as a loop-hole for the major oil interests.
TIMOTHY L. GARCIA

58. Id. at 631-632.

